

Structured Actor-Critic for Managing Public Health Points-of-Dispensing

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Outline

- Introduction to the public health problem
- Hierarchical MDP inventory and dispensing model
- The structured actor-critic approach
- Synthetic experiments
- Case study: *Naloxone for First Responders Program*

Introduction


- Public health organizations manage “points-of-dispensing” (PODs) for dispensing critical medical supplies during emergency situations.
 - Examples: vaccines, antibiotics, and others, such as **naloxone**, an opioid overdose reversal drug for harm reduction.
- Our problem: **optimal inventory control and dispensing** for a public health agency and “independent” PODs.



Problem preview

- Components of our problem:
 - A central inventory storage managed by the public health agency
 - Inventory is replenished periodically
 - A lower-level *dispensing coordinator* that interfaces with PODs
 - Receives inventory from central storage
 - Receives requests from arriving PODs (demands)

Periodically:
Inventory replenishment



Problem preview

- Features of our problem:
 - Heterogeneous utility functions that depend on the requesting POD
 - Effectiveness of the public health intervention can vary across different groups of the affected population
 - Trade-off for the dispensing coordinator:
 - *Should we satisfy a lower-priority demand now, or save the inventory for a possible higher-priority demand in the future?*
 - Two timescales
 - Slower one for inventory replenishment (central inventory manager)
 - Faster one for dispensing decisions (dispensing coordinator)
 - Stochastic demands
 - Discrete inventory states

Example 1: Opioid overdose epidemic

- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared it a **public health emergency** in 2017.
- HHS: *“Increased prescription of opioid medications led to widespread misuse of both prescription and non-prescription opioids before it became clear that these medications could indeed be highly addictive.”*
 - Previously, pharmaceutical companies said that these drugs were not addictive.

THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC BY THE NUMBERS



70,630

people died from drug overdose in 2019²



10.1 million

people misused prescription opioids in the past year¹



1.6 million

people had an opioid use disorder in the past year¹



2 million

people used methamphetamine in the past year¹



745,000

people used heroin in the past year¹



50,000

people used heroin for the first time¹



1.6 million

people misused prescription pain relievers for the first time¹



14,480

deaths attributed to overdosing on heroin (in 12-month period ending June 2020)³



48,006

deaths attributed to overdosing on synthetic opioids other than methadone (in 12-month period ending June 2020)³


SOURCES

1. 2019 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 2020.
2. NCHS Data Brief No. 394, December 2020.
3. NCHS, National Vital Statistics System. Provisional drug overdose death counts.

Example 1: Opioid overdose epidemic

A deadly dose

United States, overdose deaths involving opioids
By county, 2015



Source: Centres for Disease Control and Prevention

Source: Economist, 2017

Example 1: Opioid overdose epidemic

Daily chart


Opioid deaths in America reached new highs in the pandemic

Once a problem confined to the eastern part of the country, fentanyl has spread west

The other epidemic

United States, drug overdose deaths*


By year, '000



Source: Centres for Disease Control and Prevention

The Economist

By state, 2020†, % change on a year earlier



*Deaths involving multiple opioids counted in each category
†12-month ending August 2020, predicted

- Spreading to the western part of the country
- Job losses and social isolation may have worsened the situation
- Using drugs alone is more dangerous (no one to help)
- In King County (where Seattle is):
 - 2015 overdose deaths: 3
 - 2020 overdose deaths: 176


Example 1: Opioid overdose epidemic

- Naloxone is a drug that has the ability to reverse overdoses within minutes
 - To save lives, it is critical that this drug is widely distributed
- “Harm reduction” programs are distributing naloxone free of charge to first responders (incl. EMS, law enforcement, fire fighters, public transit drivers)
- Utility of naloxone varies across regions due to the varying levels of opioid usage in different populations
 - e.g., West Virginia DHHR distributes extra naloxone to high priority counties
- Utility of naloxone also varies across different types of first responders
 - e.g., law enforcement officers are “often a community’s first contact with opioid overdose victims after 9-1-1 services have been summoned” (Goodloe and Dailey (2014); Rando et al. (2015))

Example 2: Vaccine distribution, COVID-19 & H1N1

- Heterogenous utilities are very clear:
 - COVID-19: Compared with 5-17 age group, the rate of death is 1100 times higher in 65-74 age group, 2800 times higher in 75-84 age group, and 7900 times higher in 85 and older age group (CDC, 2021).
 - H1N1: The reported H1N1 cases from April 15 to July 24, 2009, show that the infected rate (number of cases per 100,000 population) of 0 to 4 age group is 17.6 times of the infected rate of 65 and older age group, and the rate of 5 to 24 age group is 20.5 times of the rate of 65 and older age group (CDC, 2009).

Sequence of events



- In each period, there are n sub-periods for which dispensing takes place
- Timing of events:
 - The central inventory manager decides **how much to replenish** and **how much to dispense** throughout the n sub-periods
 - The dispensing coordinator receives the inventory allotment and the sequentially receives POD requests and allocates inventory to maximize utility

Lower-level problem: Dispensing MDP

- The dispensing coordinator optimizes utility over n sub-periods (they want spend their allotment of inventory for this period optimally)
- In sub-period i of period t , the arriving POD is represented by an *attribute-demand* pair $(\xi_{t,i}, D_{t,i})$, with $D_{t,i} \in \{0, 1, \dots, D_{\max}\}$.
 - When there is no arriving POD, demand is zero.
- The utility function of satisfying x_i units of demand is $u(x_i, \xi_{t,i})$

- Lower-level objective:


$$U_0(x, \xi | w) = \max_{\mu \in \mathcal{M}} \mathbf{E} \left[\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} u(\min(\mu_i(x_i, \xi_i), D_i), \xi_i) \mid x_0 = x, \xi_0 = \xi, W_t = w \right].$$

Lower-level dispensing policy

An information state that transitions at the upper-level timescale

Upper-level problem: Inventory control MDP

- T planning periods, with two decision to be made in each period:
 - Replenish-up-to level z_t^{rep}
 - Dispense-down-to level z_t^{dis}
- The inventory state is R_t and information state is W_t
 - The information state may contain information such as past demands, current disease trends, or other dynamic information
- Holding cost h , ordering cost c_{W_t}




Upper-level problem: Inventory control MDP

- Objective is to maximize dispensing utility minus costs

$$\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \mathbf{E} \left[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \left(-hR_t - c_{W_t} (\pi_t^{\text{rep}}(R_t, W_t) - R_t) + U_0(\pi_t^{\text{rep}}(R_t, W_t) - \pi_t^{\text{dis}}(R_t, W_t), \xi_{t,0} | W_t) \right) \right].$$

- Bellman equation

$$V_t(r, w) = \max_{z^{\text{rep}}, z^{\text{dis}}} (c_w - h) r - c_w z^{\text{rep}} + \mathbf{E}_w [U_0(z^{\text{rep}} - z^{\text{dis}}, \xi_{t,0} | w) + V_{t+1}(z^{\text{dis}}, W_{t+1})].$$



Upper-level problem: Inventory control MDP

- Note that we can compute the Bellman step in two steps, one for replenishment and one for dispensing:

$$V_t(r, w) = \max_{z^{\text{rep}}, z^{\text{dis}}} (c_w - h) r - c_w z^{\text{rep}} + \mathbf{E}_w \left[U_0(z^{\text{rep}} - z^{\text{dis}}, \xi_{t,0} | w) + V_{t+1}(z^{\text{dis}}, W_{t+1}) \right].$$

.....



Can consider this the “dispensing” value function after replenishment is decided


- With a *post-decision* reformulation, we get the following:

$$\tilde{V}_t^{\text{rep}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) = -c_w z^{\text{rep}} + \mathbf{E}_w \left[U_0(z^{\text{rep}} - \pi_t^{\text{dis},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w), \xi_{t,0} | w) \right] + \tilde{V}_t^{\text{dis}}(\pi_t^{\text{dis},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w), w),$$

$$\tilde{V}_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{dis}}, w) = \mathbf{E}_w \left[(c_{W_{t+1}} - h) z^{\text{dis}} + \tilde{V}_{t+1}^{\text{rep}}(\pi_{t+1}^{\text{rep},*}(z^{\text{dis}}, W_{t+1}), W_{t+1}) \right]$$


- Policies (in red) and values (in blue) can be written in interleaving fashion

Structural properties of the MDP




- **Assumption:** For any ξ , the utility function $u(x, \xi)$ is discretely concave in x .
- **Proposition:**
 1. The lower-level MDP value function $U_i(x, \xi | w)$ is discretely concave in the inventory state x for all ξ, w , and i .
 2. The upper-level MDP value functions $\tilde{V}_t^{\text{rep}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w)$ and $\tilde{V}_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{dis}}, w)$ are discretely concave in z^{rep} and z^{dis} , resp.
 3. Optimal policies are both state-dependent, discrete basestock policies:

- $\pi_t^{\text{rep},*}(r, w) = \max\{r, l_t^{\text{rep}}(w)\},$
- $\pi_t^{\text{dis},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) = \min\{z^{\text{rep}}, l_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w)\},$
- where $l_t^{\text{rep}}(w), l_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) \in \{0, 1, \dots, R_{\max}\}.$




Structural properties of the MDP



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- where $l_t^{\text{rep}}(w), l_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) \in \{0, 1, \dots, R_{\max}\}.$



Structural properties of the MDP

Main algorithmic research question:

In a data-driven setting, is it possible to take advantage of both the **structure in the policy** and **structure in the value function**?

Approximate dynamic programming (ADP)

Reinforcement learning (RL)

- ADP/RL algorithms can be classified into the following classes:

1. **Value-based methods**, such as Q-learning (Watkins et al., 1989), use a combination of stochastic approximation and the Bellman equation to iteratively learn an *approximate value function* (or state-action values Q):

- $$Q_t^n(s, a) = (1 - \alpha_t^n) Q_t^{n-1}(s, a) + \alpha_t^n \cdot \text{observation}$$

2. **Policy-based methods**, such as policy gradient (Sutton et al., 1999), directly parameterize a class of *approximate policy functions* π_θ and optimize it via stochastic gradient methods.

3. **Actor-critic methods** (Konda & Tsitsiklis, 2000) approximate both the policy and value function. Typically use linear models for function approximation.

- Our method falls here, but we utilize two types of structure.

- “Actor” is the policy approximation, “critic” is the value approximation

Structured actor-critic algorithm

- Recall:

$$\tilde{V}_t^{\text{rep}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) = -c_w z^{\text{rep}} + \mathbf{E}_w [U_0(z^{\text{rep}} - \pi_t^{\text{dis},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w), \xi_{t,0} | w)] + \tilde{V}_t^{\text{dis}}(\pi_t^{\text{dis},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w), w),$$

$$\tilde{V}_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{dis}}, w) = \mathbf{E}_w [(c_{W_{t+1}} - h)z^{\text{dis}} + \tilde{V}_{t+1}^{\text{rep}}(\pi_{t+1}^{\text{rep},*}(z^{\text{dis}}, W_{t+1}), W_{t+1})]$$


- Also, note that:

$$\pi_t^{\text{rep},*}(r, w) \in \operatorname{argmax}_{z^{\text{rep}}} \tilde{V}_t^{\text{rep}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w),$$

$$\pi_t^{\text{dis},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) \in \operatorname{argmax}_{z^{\text{dis}}, z^{\text{rep}}} U_0(z^{\text{rep}} - z^{\text{dis}}, \xi_{t,0} | w) + \tilde{V}_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{dis}}, w)$$

- If the optimal policy and next stage value is known, we can write the current value
- If the optimal value is known, then we can write the current policy
- Let's apply these relationships in an alternating fashion

Structured actor-critic (S-AC) algorithm



- **On policy update steps:**
 - Use the value function approximation to update the policy
- **On value function update steps:**
 - Simulate the policy approximation forward (red) to update the value function


How do we represent the structure?

- **For the policy:**


- Only store the base-stock threshold $l_t^{\text{rep}}(w)$, $l_t^{\text{dis}}(z^{\text{rep}}, w)$ and then make use of the base-stock form when using the policy
- In the case of $l_t^{\text{rep}}(w)$, reduces the need to store individual policies for each inventory state

- **On value function update steps:**


- Store the value function as a sequence of **slopes** between points
- After each observation, project the value function to **maintain concavity** (i.e., make sure the slopes are non-increasing) (Nascimento and Powell, 2009)



projection
step



How do we represent the structure?



Structured actor-critic algorithm

- Input: random initial policies and piecewise concave value function
- At each iteration k , loop through all time periods t
- Simulate current policy forward to get new slope observations
- Update value function using the slope observations (and do concave proj.)
- The updated value function implies new basestock thresholds
- Update the policies
- Repeat

Algorithm 1: Structured Actor-Critic Method

Input: Lower level optimal policy μ^* (learned from backward dynamic programming). Initial policy estimates $\bar{l}^{\text{rep},0}$ and $\bar{\pi}^{\text{dis},0}$, and value estimates $\bar{v}^{\text{rep},0}$ and $\bar{v}^{\text{dis},0}$ (nonincreasing in z^{rep} and z^{dis} respectively). Stepsize rules $\tilde{\alpha}_t^k$ and $\tilde{\beta}_t^k$ for all t, k .

Output: Approximations $\bar{l}^{\text{rep},k}$, $\bar{\pi}^{\text{dis},k}$, $\bar{v}^{\text{rep},k}$, and $\bar{v}^{\text{dis},k}$.

```

1 for  $k = 1, 2, \dots$  do
2   Sample initial states  $z_0^{\text{rep},k}$  and  $z_0^{\text{dis},k}$ .
3   for  $t = 0, 1, \dots, T - 1$  do
4     Observe  $w_t^k$  and  $\xi_{t,1}^k$ , then observe  $\hat{v}_t^{\text{rep},k}$  and  $\hat{v}_t^{\text{dis},k}$  according to (17) and (18) respectively.
5     Perform SA step:
6
7       
$$\tilde{v}_t^{\text{rep},k}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) = (1 - \alpha_t^k(z^{\text{rep}}, w)) \bar{v}_t^{\text{rep},k-1}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) + \alpha_t^k(z^{\text{rep}}, w) \hat{v}_t^{\text{rep},k},$$


$$\tilde{v}_t^{\text{dis},k}(z^{\text{dis}}, w) = (1 - \alpha_t^k(z^{\text{dis}}, w)) \bar{v}_t^{\text{dis},k-1}(z^{\text{dis}}, w) + \alpha_t^k(z^{\text{dis}}, w) \hat{v}_t^{\text{dis},k}.$$

8
9     Perform the concavity projection operation (19):
10
11       
$$\bar{v}_t^{\text{rep},k} = \Pi_{z_t^{\text{rep},k}, w_t^k}(\tilde{v}_t^{\text{rep},k}), \quad \bar{v}_t^{\text{dis},k} = \Pi_{z_t^{\text{dis},k}, w_t^k}(\tilde{v}_t^{\text{dis},k}).$$

12
13     Observe and update the replenish-up-to threshold:
14
15       
$$\hat{l}_t^{\text{rep},k} = \arg \max_{z^{\text{rep}} \in \bar{\mathcal{Z}}(0)} \sum_{j=0}^{z^{\text{rep}}} \bar{v}_t^{\text{rep},k}(j, w_t^k),$$


$$\bar{l}_t^{\text{rep},k}(w) = (1 - \beta_t^k(w)) \bar{l}_t^{\text{rep},k-1}(w) + \beta_t^k(w) \hat{l}_t^{\text{rep},k}.$$

16
17     Observe and update the dispense-down-to policy:
18
19     for  $z_t^{\text{rep}} = 0, 1, \dots, R_{\max}$  do
20
21       
$$\hat{\pi}_t^{\text{dis}} = \arg \max_{z^{\text{dis}} \in \underline{\mathcal{Z}}(z_t^{\text{rep}})} U_0^{\mu^*}(z_t^{\text{rep}} - z^{\text{dis}}, \xi_{t,0}^k | w_t^k) + \sum_{j=0}^{z^{\text{dis}}} \bar{v}_t^{\text{dis},k}(j, w_t^k),$$


$$\bar{\pi}_t^{\text{dis},k}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) = (1 - \alpha^k(z^{\text{rep}}, w)) \bar{\pi}_t^{\text{dis},k-1}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) + \alpha^k(z^{\text{rep}}, w) \hat{\pi}_t^{\text{dis}}.$$

22
23     end
24
25     If  $t < T - 1$ , take  $z_{t+1}^{\text{rep},k}$  and  $z_{t+1}^{\text{dis},k}$  according to the  $\epsilon$ -greedy exploration policy.
26   end
27 end
```

Almost sure convergence of S-AC

Theorem. Both the value function and policy approximations converge to their optimal counterparts almost surely. We have

$$\bar{v}_t^{\text{rep},k}(z^{\text{rep}}, w) \xrightarrow{k \rightarrow \infty} v_t^{\text{rep},*}(z^{\text{rep}}, w),$$


$$\bar{\pi}_t^{\text{rep},k}(r, w) \xrightarrow{k \rightarrow \infty} \pi_t^{\text{rep},*}(r, w),$$

almost surely. Same holds for the dispensing values and policies.


Baseline algorithms vs S-AC

- **Multi-stage version of SPAR** (Nascimento and Powell, 2009)
 - Uses concave value functions + a temporal difference to update slopes without a policy approximation
- **Actor-critic (AC)** with linear function approximations for both policy and value function
- **Monte-Carlo policy gradient (PG)** with the same policy function approximation as the AC algorithm
- **Q-learning (QL)**: each state-action pair is updated independently
 - S-AC and SPAR lie in between the extremes of AC/PG and QL


Synthetic experiments (iterations)



(a) $R_{\max} = 20, |\mathcal{W}| = 3$



(b) $R_{\max} = 40, |\mathcal{W}| = 9$




(c) $R_{\max} = 60, |\mathcal{W}| = 15$


- **Main takeaways:**

- AC is the most competitive when accounting for the number of iterations
- PG and AC do well initially, especially for the largest problem, likely due to the fact that they use stochastic policies (initially random) that encourage exploration early on
- Vanilla Q-learning is largely ineffective


Synthetic experiments (CPU time)



(a) $R_{\max} = 20, |\mathcal{W}| = 3$



(b) $R_{\max} = 40, |\mathcal{W}| = 9$




(c) $R_{\max} = 60, |\mathcal{W}| = 15$

- **Main takeaways:**


- SPAR (value functions with concavity projection) is most competitive
- PG and AC act on the original action space $(z^{\text{rep}}, z^{\text{dis}})$, so updates are slightly slower than SPAR and S-AC (which take advantage of structure)

Synthetic experiments (convergence of thresholds)


Instance 1: 9 information states



(a) $w_0 = 1$




(b) $w_0 = 4$




(c) $w_0 = 8$


Instance 2: 12 information states



(a) $w_0 = 2$




(b) $w_0 = 6$




(c) $w_0 = 10$


Instance 3: 15 information states



(a) $w_0 = 2$



(b) $w_0 = 7$



(c) $w_0 = 12$

- **Main takeaway:**

- S-AC exhibits more stable convergence to the true threshold, compared to the “implied” thresholds of the other algorithms


Synthetic experiments (sensitivity analysis)

Figure 8: Convergence of replenish-up-to thresholds at $t = 0$ for the $R_{\max} = 60, |\mathcal{W}| = 15$ instance.

Table 3: Impact of parameters on ADP algorithms for the $R_{\max} = 50, |\mathcal{W}| = 9$ instance.

Parameter	Value	AC	PG	QL	S-AC	SPAR	Exact
Mean total demand	30, Normal	19,037	16,009	7,287	20,313	19,077	21,332
	30, Uniform	18,113	15,142	8,476	20,865	20,098	21,332
	50, Normal	28,422	23,237	10,318	29,080	28,278	29,387
	50, Uniform	28,023	23,112	10,286	29,077	28,150	29,387
Mean ordering cost	30	30,914	25,488	15,125	33,532	32,671	34,647
	50	18,037	14,009	7,287	20,313	19,077	20,689
	70	11,257	8,660	6,032	11,866	11,553	11,984
Holding cost	5	18,037	14,009	7,287	20,313	19,077	20,689
	20	18,402	15,064	7,189	19,839	19,285	20,131
	35	17,807	14,498	5,855	19,381	18,784	19,592
	50	17,150	15,011	4,582	18,988	18,418	19,203
	65	16,575	13,708	2,954	18,597	17,931	18,835

Case study: Naloxone for First Responders Program




- **Setup:**


- Motivation: the NFRP program’s hierarchical structure relies on a centralized coordination entity (our “dispensing coordinator”)
- Data: monthly opioid overdose data from the five most-affected counties in Pennsylvania (these are the PODs)
- Utility function of a county is based on proportion of incidents occurring there relative to the other counties

S-AC with clustered information states

- **Weakness of S-AC:** Exploits structure in the inventory dimension but not the information dimension
- The case study has a 5-dimensional information space, which becomes challenging to handle
- **Minor extension:** Perform k-means clustering in the information dimension and then run S-AC on an “aggregated MDP”
 - Similar to aggregation in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy, 1996, but *only* in the information state




Case study: Naloxone for First Responders Program




- **Heuristics**

- **Upper-level:** Mean = replenish up to the mean demand
- **Lower-level:** FCFS = dispense in a first-come-first-serve manner
- **Lower-level:** DPR = solve using DP with discrete states, then regress on result


Case study: Naloxone for First Responders Program




Case study: Naloxone for First Responders Program




(a) Allegheny




(b) York




(c) Bucks



(d) Dauphin



(e) Luzerne



Thank you! Questions?

Please feel free to email me at drjiang@pitt.edu for additional comments!

A revised version of this paper will be available soon.